"The Double Agent" in Al Megrahi's book:
'YOU ARE MY JUSTICE'
'YOU ARE MY JUSTICE'
CH 14th of April, 2012 / Witness no. 548
MISSION LOCKERBIE:
Edwin Bollier of MEBO responds to Chapter 4, "The Double Agent", in John Ashton's book Megrahi: You are my Jury and identifies Lockerbie's "mysterious man".
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi introduces Chapter 4, "The Double Agent", as follows: "Of the legion of characters in the Lockerbie saga, Edwin Bollier is undoubtedly the most colourful. He was also one of the few whom I ever met."
When I read those remarks, I felt I was back in the Scottish Court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands where the prosecution had deliberately and wrongly set their sights on Libya.
Why did the media portray me as an agent of the CIA ?
Yes, I did avail myself of the opportunity and tried early in 1991, after I had been questioned in Zürich by FBI officials about Lockerbie, to become a CIA agent (but surely not to work against the former Gaddafi regime, which was MEBO's most important customer).
Also, how could I have served as an agent of the STASI in East Germany (GDR)?
As a Swiss entrepreneur I was able through MEBO Ltd to supply all types of goods (including electronics) to the GDR. All such supplies were delivered with official export documentation to the then current address: Institute of Technology (Testing), Bernau, GDR. Any embargoed goods ordered by the GDR were intercepted by the Swiss Customs and returned to MEBO (where the goods remain to this day). That I was considered a so-called "IM" by the STASI and code-named "Rubin", I only found out after the collapse of the GDR in 1989 when I was being interrogated about the Pan Am atrocity by the West German police (BKA) at Konstanz.
I, Edwin Bollier, was no agent of the STASI !
Interestingly, it was via the "Gauck Authorities" in Berlin that I learned the STASI had actually suspected me of being a possible CIA agent....
Thus, it is obvious that I was being set up to be abused and misrepresented as an unreliable witness with all this mysterious "Secret-Service-Spectacle" by the Lockerbie prosecution
(Scottish Lord Advocate).
Robert M Fanning, Legal Attaché at the US Embassy in Berne, invited me to Washington in February 1991. Believing that Mr Fanning was himself a CIA collaborator, I was told, at the Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in Washington, that Mr Fanning was in fact working for the FBI special agent Richard A Marquise, who led the US Task Force which comprised the Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI.
In short, a collaboration between me and the CIA did not happen (except for the "catch letter" comedy). And there were more messages of that nature....
After my interrogation at the FBI training centre in Quantico, Virginia, about a possible link between the MST-13 timer fragment and the bombing of Pan Am 103, and at the end of my visit to the USA, I was offered by Task Force chief Richard Marquise a sum of up to US$ 4 million if I would sign a police protocol stating that MST-13 timer fragment PT/35 (allegedly found at Lockerbie) was part of 20-piece delivery of MST-13 timers from MEBO to Libya.
In addition, I was offered residence in the USA under a new identity.
After being handed an FBI reward poster (grey coloured, A4, reward $ 4,000,000 and picturing wads of US dollars in two suitcases), I refused this immoral deal by insisting that, as per my earlier statement (1990), the fragment PT/35 was from a prototype PC-Board and could not be connected to the MST-13 timers sent to Libya.
As I was not shown the original PT/35 fragment (only on an FBI photo, picture ? 334) I returned to Switzerland, frustrated, where I informed an official of the Swiss Federal Police (BUPO) of the incident.
Chronology:
Before FBI expert Tom Thurman on 15 June 1990 published that he found "the yielded fruit (PT/35) within two days" in the criminal investigation into the Lockerbie bombing, the Swiss Federal Police (BUPO) on 14 February 1990 showed an FBI Polaroid photo of the MST-13 fragment (PT/35) of a printed circuit board to the owners of MEBO Ltd (Erwin Meister and Edwin Bollier).
Excerpt from Lockerbie trial transcript at Camp Zeist 2000 - Witness no. 567, Peter Flückiger of Swiss Federal Police (BUPO) on the Crown list:
Q. Thank you. Can you now look at Production 1568. Is that the record of an interview with Mr Meister conducted in Zürich on the 14th of February 1990? (Edwin Bollier was also present)
A. That is correct. I wrote it myself. ---
I and Erwin Meister understood quickly that the picture showed a fragment of a MEBO MST-13 timer PC-board. On closer inspection, I noticed an important detail that the PC-board (PT/35) originated from a handmade prototype and that it was fabricated from a non-functioning MST-13 timer.
After further interviews with FBI officials and Scottish Police officers in Zürich and after my visits in 1991 to the FBI in Washington, and to the Scottish Police in Glasgow, I understood only too clearly that the MST-13 timer fragment allegedly found in Lockerbie was a manipulated piece of evidence which was intended to link Libya with the Lockerbie atrocity.
In 1991, I was invited to the FBI headquarters in Washington and Commissioner Richard Marquise offered me up to US$ 4 million and a new identity in the States if I would confirm in a police statement that the allegedly found MST-13 timer fragment originated from one of the 20 timers delivered to Libya between 1985 and 1986.
Then, I had no doubt that a huge conspiracy against Libya was on the way.
Contrary to what the Libyan Crown witness, Majid Giaka - a paid agent of the CIA - said, I rejected the offer. (Giaka is currently living in the USA under a new identity.)
After 23 years of work in the Lockerbie affair, I am convinced that the decision of the Westminster Government to keep the document closed under the pretext of "national security" is intended to prevent the truth coming out about the manipulated MST-13 timer fragment and to avoid having to pay compensation.
Today, it seems to me that my rejecting the FBI deal had an effect on the 2000 trial at Camp Zeist. Right from the start, I was projected as a "colourful and questionable" Crown witness by the éminence grise within the prosecution, obviously as revenge for my rejection of the FBI offer, and therefore my loss of all credibility as a defence witness for Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Libya was deliberately engineered !
Furthermore, the prosecution were implying that I had received "compensation" of over US$ 1.8 million from Libya for my witness statements - again completely untrue !
The Lord Advocate (Colin Boyd) very craftily managed to classify me, Ed Bollier (and later also Erwin Meister), as a "questionable, that is to say unreliable" witness. Thus, the Lord Advocate of Scotland determined the targeting of the sights so that true events, which would have cleared al-Megrahi and Libya of the Pan Am 103 atrocity, were ridiculed as inventions or fictional stories as in the spy film The Third Man, and then dismissed as "nonsense" or "lies"!
A further piece of the Lockerbie jigsaw puzzle was revealed to me when I read John Ashton's excellently researched book Megrahi: You are my Jury, subtitled The Lockerbie Evidence which at page 80 talks about "a mysterious man who turned up at the [MEBO] office on 30 December 1988." (Was this The Third Man?)
It is true that we (Meister and Bollier, MEBO) had our doubts about the order placed just before Christmas 1988 for 40 MST-13 timers for Libya from Hassan Badri (ABH), and about the refusal to accept the 40 Olympus replacement timers, as well as Hassan Badri's sudden departure from the office that ABH were renting from MEBO Ltd.
On or about 26 December 1988, we tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to telephone Abdelbaset al-Megrahi in Tripoli.
As I, Edwin Bollier, observed, when removing the batteries from one of the Olympus timers that the Libyans had returned, the timer display program showed that it had been set for"pm 7:30 hour, WED". And on Friday morning 30 December 1988 at about 10am, I recall that the "mysterious man" - obviously an intelligence agent - told me he knew, among other things, that I had taken the timers to Libya and had travelled back via Malta, which was not true. Apparently, this agent had not been informed (or only belatedly) by his agency that I flew with Swissair direct from Tripoli to Zürich.
Also, he disclosed that Libya had perpetrated the atrocity on Pan Am 103 and suggested I should hand a note to the US Consulate in Zürich, care of the CIA, with - among other things - information about my journeys and activities during my visits to Libya and Malta, from 18 to 20 December 1988...??? (see full story in Megrahi: You are my Jury, page 80, or in police Witness Statement, or in Court transcript for Day 27 (23 June 2000), Witness no. 548 Edwin Bollier, under oath.)
As further news appeared in the media, that Pan Am 103 had crashed because of a bomb attack, we reflected and discussed whether Libya really could have been involved in the PanAm 103 incident... And decided to write the demanded letter to the CIA, as was suggested to me by the intelligence agent.
However, I composed this "catch letter" as a sort of sting operation in order to discover the background of this mysterious intelligence officer who was accusing Libya of the atrocious deed on Pan Am 103. Since he knew all about my visit to Libya, the "intelligence officer" must logically have belonged to the inner circle of those who intentionally wanted to blame Libya for the Lockerbie tragedy.
In court, this serious and crucial matter was turned into a joke by the advocate when he compared it to the spy thriller film set in Vienna, with the Ferris wheel, as in The Third Man, and went on to describe it as a "nothingness".
John Ashton, the author of Megrahi: You are my Jury researched correctly when he wrote that the first suspicion that Libya was behind the Pan Am 103 atrocity was attributed to MEBO's "catch letter", which was delivered on 19 January 1989 to the US Embassy in Vienna c/o the CIA. It was not however until 14 to 18 January 1991 (two years later), when police investigators met at BUPO headquarters in Zürich, that the Scottish Police were first told by the FBI about the "catch letter" that MEBO had addressed to the CIA, and about the CIA's radio contact with AGA>>AGU that had taken place between Friday 27 January 1989 to Friday 17 March 1989.... Curious??
After an eighteen-month legal battle, I have now gained access to the file notes of the Swiss Ministry of Justice for the meeting on 24/25 May 1989 between the Swiss Police and the delegation of Scottish investigators. From these notes, it emerges that the delegates spoke of a "barometric timer", not simply of a "timer", and it was clear therefore that Marwan Khreesat was involved. Khreesat was also linked to the attack on the El Al aircraft in Rome (1972).
In the report of this May 1989 meeting, not a single mention is made of MEBO, Libya or Megrahi. Obviously BUPO Police Commissioner Flückiger, who was a participant at the meeting.
On 22 June 1989, twenty-eight days after the Swiss/Scottish Police meeting, MEBO engineer Ulrich Lumpert handed over, without permission, to an official delegate in the "Lockerbie Case" a stolen MST-13 circuit board at MEBO Ltd. (This accords with Ulrich Lumpert's Affidavit, Article 2, of 18 July 2007, though not with Lumpert's statement to Police Commissioner Peter F. at the time.)
With regard to the latest forensic evidence up to March 2012 and all the discovered events, proofs and facts, the following resumé can retrospectively be drawn, showing that the whole structure of the "Lockerbie Affair" was a criminally-engineered, wilful false-flag intelligence operation against Libya and al-Megrahi from a yet unknown originator, in which 270 innocent people lost their lives!
1988 to April 1989, the GDR had employees in the Libyan security and military concept...see for example the Court transcript of the interrogation of Edwin Bollier, Witness no. 548, Day 27 (23 June 2000):
LORD SUTHERLAND: Yes, Mr. Burns.
MR BURNS: Thank you, My Lords:
Q. Mr. Bollier, you received instructions to write a letter to be delivered to the United States embassy in Vienna implicating Libya in the PanAm 103 bombing, did you not?
A. Look, I think you are confusing things completely. First of all, I wasn't in East Berlin on the 5th. I was in Zürich. And on the 19th, I was in East Berlin where this subject was raised. And on the 19th, the letter was already at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. You are trying to make me say things which are completely wrong.
Q. Well, I wouldn't want you to say something that was wrong, Mr. Bollier, given your efforts to tell the truth at all times in respect to this matter. So let's just recap a little.You received an instruction to write a letter to the United States embassy in Vienna implicating Libya in the Pan Am 103 bombing. You told us that in your evidence in chief, didn't you?
A. But not from the East Germans, but from that mystery man who visited me on the 30th of December 1988.
Q. Well, let's just --
A. He spoke German with an English accent.
Q. Let's just pause and consider the mystery man for a moment. The latest version of the mystery man you gave us in court, Mr. Bollier, involved him approaching you near to MEBO's offices; is that right?
A. That is correct. Yes. He was walking back and forth in the corridor.
Q. Right. So he was waiting. And he stepped out to meet you, did he, this mystery man?
A. I went towards our office, and I saw this man.
Q. Was he wearing a mackintosh, by any chance, Mr. Bollier?
A. Yes, that is correct. A light-coloured mackintosh.
Q. He didn't happen to have a trilby pulled down over his eyes, did he, Mr. Bollier?
A. No. He didn't.
Q. No trilby. Do you recall hearing zither music when heapproached you, Mr Bollier?
A. [Microphone override] -- music?
Q. There was no zither music?
A. No.
Q. Could you see a Ferris wheel in the distance, perhaps?
A. No.
Q. So it was just a plain mysterious man in a mack?
A. Yes. What you say is correct. Presumably it was somebody from the intelligence people.
Q. You see, you indulged in yet this further mystery at a very early stage of your investigation by the authorities, again, to disguise your links with the Stasi, didn't you?
>
A. No. I reject that. It's not true. In this Lockerbie matter, there are only very odd things.
Q. In your evidence on the Lockerbie matter, there are only very odd things, Mr. Bollier; would that be more accurate?
A. I am here in order to help solve the case. And if you don't take me seriously, that's your matter. I take this matter very seriously. I've been working on this case for eight years, and I know where one has to seek. One has to look at the fragment and the container. And what you are doing is trying to make me an insincere witness. You are trying to water down my testimony, and that is a great pity.
Q. Perhaps, Mr. Bollier, you are the great pity. But let us move on to the 19th of January when you went to East Berlin by way of Vienna. And you remember on the 19th of January you went into the United States embassy in Vienna and deposited there a letter?
A. That is correct. I think it was at 8.00 in the evening. That's when I wanted to hand in the letter.
Q. You weren't approached by any chance, were you, by some mysterious man in a light mack while you were in Vienna on the 19th of January 1989, were you, Mr. Bollier?
A. No. I went up the stairs and --
Q. Before you go up the stairs, I just want to stay with the mysterious man for a moment longer. Because only a week ago, when you gave a further interview about this matter, you suggested, did you not, that you were approached by a mysterious man in Vienna wearing a light mack. Do you not remember that?
A. No. That is wrong. That is wrong.
Q. All right. Well, let's have on the screen in front of you, so that we can consider it in a little detail, Production 323. And I think if we begin with page 1 on the screen. And stay first of all at the top of the page. Do you recognise the letter, Mr. Bollier, as the letter which you delivered to the United States embassy in Vienna on 19th January 1989? Yes or no?
A. That is correct. I handed the letter in. I didn't send it.
Q. I appreciate that, Mr. Bollier. Thank you. Now, you say you drafted this letter in Zürich and then took it with you en route back to East Berlin; is that right?
A. I drafted it in Zürich, but I didn't take it to East Berlin. I took it to the U.S. embassy in Vienna.
Q. Try and listen to the question, Mr Bollier. You were travelling from Zürich to East Berlin by way of Vienna and en route to East Berlin to see the members of the Stasi. You stopped in Vienna and deposited this letter at the United States embassy. That is correct, is it not?
A. That is correct. Yes.
Q. Do try and listen to the actual question I ask, Mr Bollier. It would assist matters. Thank you. Now, let's have a look at the letter. There you are in Zürich, and you just happen to have in your possession sheets of notepaper from the Hotel Al Kabir in Tripoli, Libya. Now, that was a happy coincidence, wasn't it, Mr. Bollier.
A. I always have paper from various hotels with me.
Q. Mr Bollier, you didn't even stay in the Hotel Al Kabir when you were in Libya in December 1988, did you?
A. I was very often in that hotel earlier, at earlier dates, and I took letter paper from several hotels.
Q. Do you recall on a previous occasion suggesting that you had procured the paper from an agent of yours in Libya?
A. No.
Q. Memory is a difficult thing for you, isn't it, Mr Bollier?
A. No. My memory is good. I had some paper from various hotels, and I took some from the Hotel Al Kabir. It's just a matter of chance that I had that.
Q. So you travel constantly with large quantities of hotel newspaper from various hotels in Tripoli; is that what you are telling us, Mr Bollier?
A. No. No. That's not what I am trying to say. But when you are in a hotel, you very often take some writing paper with you. You may have jotted down notes. So one takes some letter paper. I don't think that's anything special.
Q. Rather confusing for a legitimate Swiss businessman to correspond from Zürich on notepaper headed Hotel Al Kabir, Tripoli, Libya, isn't it, Mr Bollier?
A. The notepaper was meant only to -- well, how shall I put it? Well, for that order, I selected that paper myself.
Q. I'm sure you did, Mr Bollier. And the reason you selected that paper was because by employing that paper, you were able to more convincingly write a letter implicating Libya in the Pan Am 103 bombing; is that not correct?
A. That is correct. Yes.
Q. Now, let's move on a little to the terms of the letter. You begin by saying: "Attention CIA." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then in the numbered paragraphs below, you say: "My code name is AGA"; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And then the paragraph numbered 2, you say:"Your code name is AGU."
A. AGU. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And you then gave a series of radio traffic frequencies upon which you could be contacted at certain times?
A. That is correct.
Q. And we'll come to this in more detail in a moment. You were in fact contacted on these frequencies in due course, weren't you?
A. That is also correct. Yes.
Q. And in paragraph number 5, you intimate that what you want to be given and transmitted by various code names are telex numbers, fax numbers, phone numbers, in the United States, together with a PO-box address in the United States; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Then you go on in this letter at paragraph number 8 to say: "The first short information concerns the Pan Am Flight 103." Do you see that?
A. That is correct.
Q. And what you then put in that paragraph is fantasy or fiction, is it not?
A. That is correct. Yes.
Q. But you were just following orders, Mr Bollier, weren't you?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, during your examination in chief --
LORD SUTHERLAND: Mr Keen, if I may interrupt. Are you moving from the letter now?
MR KEEN: I am going to certainly deal more fully with the letter. But if My Lord is contemplating an adjournment, so be it.
LORD SUTHERLAND: Very well. 15 minutes.
--- Proceedings recessed at 11.12 a.m.
--- Proceedings resumed at 11.29 a.m.
LORD SUTHERLAND: Mr Keen.
MR KEEN: My Lords.
Q. Mr. Bollier, you were referred by the Crown to the transcript of your examination before the Swiss judge in January 1991. And I wonder if we could just have on the screen Production 1530, at page 36. My Lords will find the hard-copy English translation as 1531 and the reference made by the Crown to question 215. And you were being referred at this point in your examination to the letter which we've just seen on the notepaper of the Hotel Al Kabir. And you were asked, and I quote the question: "There is certain information available relating to this letter. What were your reasons for this action?" Do you see that question, Mr Bollier?
A. That is correct. Yes.
Q. [Microphone override] -- the purpose of the letter was to divert the investigators from the wrong tracks and to bring them on the track of the Libyans." That was your answer?
A. That is correct. Yes.
Q. Now, Mr Bollier, we know, fortunately not just from your evidence, perhaps, that this letter was delivered to the United States embassy in Vienna on 19th January 1989. Do you remember that?
A. That is correct.
Q. You became aware -- if you were not already aware -- that the Stasi monitored the telephone traffic of the BKA, the Bundes-kriminalamt, of West Germany; is that correct?
A. I cannot say whether this is correct. I didn't know that. One would assume so.
Q. Do you not recollect, at the time of the protocol in Switzerland in 1990, it being drawn to your attention that they monitored that traffic but could not monitor the Secret Service because they had not been able to overcome the Elcrotel system? Do you remember that?
A. No. No.
Q. Well, let's not divert too far for the moment, Mr Bollier, and just stick with 19th January 1989, when you prepare a letter, not only to bring the investigators on the track of the Libyans but to divert the investigators from the wrong track. And the wrong track, as referred to by you, was the pursuance of the PFLP General Command by the BKA and the other investigators, was it not?
A. No.
Q. Well, Mr Bollier, you say that the letter was not only to implicate the Libyans but to divert the investigators from the wrong track. And I have to suggest to you that an ordinary legitimate Swiss business-man would not have known by 19th January 1989 that the investigators were on the track of any particular party but that a legitimate Swiss businessman who was a Stasi collaborator could have been advised by the Stasi at a meeting in East Berlin on 5th January 1989 that the BKA were on the track of the PFLP General Command. Now, what do you say about that, Mr Bollier?
A. I must reject that. What you are telling me is not true. It is not true.
Q. Well, with respect, Mr Bollier, there was no press report by 19th January 1989 which put the investigators on a specific track relating to the PFLP General Command.
LORD MACLEAN: Mr Keen, I am slightly bothered about your reference to "the wrong track." Now, our translation is" tracks," plural. Throughout, you've used the word -- the singular, "wrong track." I take it our translation is correct, is it? Are you using it anyway?
MR KEEN: I am using the translation, My Lord.
LORD MACLEAN: Yes.
MR KEEN: And I am quite happy to use the word "tracks," rather than "track."
Q. Now, what you said was that you were not only putting the investigators on the track of the Libyans but diverting them from the wrong tracks. Do you see that, Mr Bollier?
A. Well, yes, I signed the text, and this is what I testified at the time. But, well ...
Q. You weren't just lying again, were you, Mr Bollier?
A. I never lie.
Q. Well, in that event, you must have been told by the 19th of January 1989 that the investigators were on certain tracks which did not include the Libyans; is that not correct?
A. That is not correct. Nobody has told me anything of the sort. This man, who showed up on the 30th of December, said that the Libyans had done it. And it is from him that I got onto these tracks. And I wrote the letter on the order of this Secret Service man +++
+++The Third Man: The first key to uncovering the "Lockerbie-Action" against Libya and Abdelbaset al-Megrahi (who actually have nothing to do with the PanAm 103 bombing) is the search for this mysterious man.
We are looking for the intelligence agent, who on Friday, 30th December 1988, at about 10 am, visited Bollier at MEBO's office in Zürich, Switzerland.
He spoke English, little German with an English accent.
In appearance, he was like the freelance journalist Dr Alan George, London UK.
by Edwin Bollier, Witness no. 548, MEBO Ltd, Telecommunication Switzerland
Einstellungsverfügung vom 31. März 2004
Setting of a criminal investigation from 31 March 2004
Setting of a criminal investigation from 31 March 2004
Zürich, 14. April, 2012
Manipulated evidence, etc. by expert Allen Feraday (RARDE)
Excerpts from the Court-documents, Kamp van Zeist.
Witness no. 994 Mr. William Williamson, Scottish Chief Inspector, sworn statement:
Q- And if I can just quote this following account:
In early September 1990, members of the Scottish Lockerbie inquiry team, together with officers of the British Security Service*, were making arrangements to travel to Switzerland. Their intention was to meet members of the Swiss police and intelligence service. The purpose of the meeting was to take forward a line of inquiry suggesting that the company MEBO might have been the manufacturers of the MST 13 timing device.
*(= MI5, their intention was to meet members of the Swiss police "BUPO" Bundespolizei, until 2000, now Fedpol and intelligence service (before 2010 service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) with the Strategie Intelligence Service SND.)
Such a device had already been identified as forming part of the improvised explosive devise responsible for the destruction of PanAm 103.
(=The police had been led to believe that such a device, as there is only the conclusion that the IED was ingested at Frankfurt and that what had been found on the ground at Lockerbie was genuinely from the crash, which I have shown at length it was not)
Prior to the departure of these officers, a request was made by CIA to the British Security Service to deter or delay"-- I'll read that again--" to deter or delay the members of the Scottish Lockerbie inquiry team from making the visit. "This request was refused, and the visit proceeded as planned. Separately, officers of the CIA met with the Swiss police and intelligence service on the day before the visit made by the Scottish Lockerbie inquiry team and the British Security Service."
(That the CIA should have met (BUPO, DAP or SND) before the visit bty the LE and MI5, is itself very suspicious as the CIA had no loci standi whatsoever in the Lockerbie Investigation, while the FBI did, even if VC claims that "he headed the Lockerbie Investigation for the CIA". Interfere more like.)
Now, Mr. Williamson, were you made aware of these steps to deter or delay the members of the Scottish Lockerbie inquiry team from making the visit to Switzerland?
A- Absolutely not, sir.
(Mr. Williams, was not aware what the CIA was up to. That I am certsain was deliberate !)
Q- These were never disclosed to you ?
A- I have no knowledge of that information you've just read out wathsoever.
(It was the first time Williamson had learned there was a CIA dimension, unless he is lying, or a bit dim !)
Q- Was it disclosed to you that the day before you met with the Swiss police and intelligence services on the first visit the CIA had already met with them ?
Mr. TURNBULL: Don't answer that.----
(= Why has Turnbull (prosecutor) intervened? It would imply that Williamson had knowledge of what the CIA was up to. The argument can only be maintained if W is isgnorant of the malicious dealings of the CIA.)
Q- Was it disclosed to you that prior to your visit, the CIA had met with the Swiss police and intelligence services ?
A- No, sir.
(= So T can go on to say "It's all a bit of makebelieve")
Q- Was it ever disclosed to you why the CIA might have wanted to deter the Scottish Lockerbie inquiry team from making their visit to Switzerland?
A- No, sir, I didn't ever know that they did do.
(= Fairly easy to see an adverse conclusion. They hadn't got their story quite right. At every point the LE is choreographed to see only what the CIA wants it to see. The stage lighting goes on, the conjuring trick is performed and the lights go off again. What did you see? What a strange way to conduct a perfectly ordinary investigation.)>
MEBO Commentary:
Important: "Intelligence Meetings" in BERNE (Switzerland) with CIA and that British Security service were accomplished, before the Federal Office for police (BAP) in Switzerland had given the "ok" to the official legal aid request of Lord Advocate of Scotland, at the 30. Oktober 1990 !
Important: Die "Intelligence Meetings" in BERN (Switzerland) mit CIA und dem British Security Service wurden durchgeführt, bevor das Bundesamt für Polizeiwesen (BAP) in Switzerland dem offiziellen Rechtshilfe- Ersuchen von Lord Advocate von Scotland, am 30. Oktober 1990 die Zustimmung erteilt hatte !
From the "BUPO" police interrogations in early 1990 of Meister and Bollier, Dr. Hayes, Allen Feraday and Police Chief William Williamson, could prove the MST-13 timer fragment real (PT-35) was derived from a prototype circuit board. That was for dis "Scott" a *problem, because Libya have not received from MEBO Ltd prototype MST-13 Timer, so with this fragment could not be related Libya in the bombing of PanAm 103.
Durch die "BUPO" Polizei Einvernahmen Anfang 1990 von Meister und Bollier, wurde Dr. Hayes, Allen Feraday und Police chief William Williamson bekannt, dass MEBO nachweisen konnte, dass das reale MST-13 Timerfragment (PT-35) von einem Prototyp Circuit Board abstammte. Das gab für dis "Scotts" ein *Problem, weil Libyen mit diesem Fragment nicht in Verbindung gebracht werden konnte.
Da Williamson und sein Team Anfang September 1990 nach Bern f'r ein Meeting von "BUPO" eingeladen wurden, mussten mit Polaroid Fotos von "RARDE", einem Label (DP137) mit Datum vom 10. September 1990, und einem Memorandum (logischer Weise ebenfalls datiert mit Sept. 1990) die BUPO-Leute überzeugt werden, dass das MST-13 Timerfragment von einem grünen Circuit Board (Libya Timer) abstammte.
Important: Prior to this date (September 1990) was supplied by Siemens in Germany (supposedly from a forensic reasons) the real prototype MST-13 fragment (Photo No.334) already on 27th April 1990 was sawed in two. (= which Ed. Bollier has been saying for a long time)
+++
WITNESS: no. 118, MICHAEL LANGFORD-JOHNSON, sworn
Detective Inspector Michael Langford-Johnson officer with the Strathclyde police based at Glasgow:<
Q- Could you have before you, please, Label Number 353 and Label Number 419. Now, is Label 353, Inspector, the fragment of the printed circuit board referred to by you as PT/35 ?
A- Yes. And it bears my signature on it as well.
Q- Thank you. Now, is Label Number 419 apparently a sample removed from that fragment ?
A- It is. And it bears my signature on the label again, sir.
Q- Had that sample already been removed by the time you began assisting Inspector Williamson ?
A- It had, yes.
Q- Thank you.
+++
The larger "carbonized brown fragment" part nr. 353 = PT/35 was subsequently replaced by a duplicate green circuit board and got the police designation PT/35 (b). The removed smaller "carbonized brown part" nr. 419 = DP/31 (a) was about technical reasons (complicated fire marking) still stay in the original "carbonized part fragment".
Around the PROBLEM to solve, as written in the memorandum (of Feraday to Williamson) and around convincingly depict, had at a later time for the court process (with providing Examinations report 181 from (RARDE) on police Labels get different dates antedate and/or are overwritten !
The "Memorandum" of expert Allen Feraday is addressed to "Detective Inspector Williamson"; it's deliberate back dated to 15th September 1989. It is about the "Fragment of green Circuit Board".
It begins: "Willy, enclosed are some Polaroid photographs of the green circuit board.
Sorry about the quality, but it is the best I can do in such a short time. Because Williamson wanted to take the photos to Bern to BUPO. The photos were intentionally not be of good quality, so the difference from the previous professional MST/13- Photo from the FBI (Flückiger visited MEBO, February 1990) does not deviate too much !
Further in the text of the Memorandum:
"The diameter of the curvature of the edge is 0.6 inches IE".
Why had Feraday the MST-13 fragment as (PT/35) of green circuit board discovered alleged in 12th May 1989 on his mysteriouse Examination Notes on page 51 ? I think the FRAUD is quite clear !
The next paragraph in the Memorandum says it all: "I feel that this fragment could be potentially most important, so any light your lads/lasses can shed upon the *PROBLEM of identifying it would be most welcome." END
*The PROBLEM was solved with the exchange of the brown Proto-type MST/13 fragment with the green MST-13 fragment (PT/35 b) (the 20 piece MST-13 Timer, delivered 1985/86 to Libya, had green Circuit boards) !
See: Police DP'137 label, the org. Date: Monday, 10 September 1990 - was backdated (overwritten) to Friday, 15 September 1989 !
(The day of 10 Sept. 1990, had to be overridden at the Sept. 15 because the 10th of September, in 1989, would have fallen on a Sunday … (= Good point).
In other Allen's writing was Feraday analysed for various documents from a graduate graphologist VDG (2012). The analysis shows that the additional page 51, in comparison to the pages 49-50 ---52-53-54-55-56 --- 102 --- on the memorandum - the Police DP'137 label - several months later !
The font change to the memorandum, compared with the label DP'137 shows that the memorandum was written September 1989, months different from Sept. 1990th.
Curious: Experts Dr. Hayes and Feraday (RARDE) had discovered this fragment alleged on 12th May 1989, four months after the Memorandum and photos date (15 Sept. 1989) ? The same fragment was recorded with photo together with a fragment of a grey shirt (PI995) Ref PP8932, in the doubtful page 51 of the examination notes of "RARDE" ? Why Mr. Feraday did not hand over the photos of PT/35 at Detective Inspector Williamson in May 1989 ?
Q-- ask also Dr. Hayes, why Mr. Feraday had not hand over the photos of the MST/13 fragment (PT/35) on this time to Detective Inspector Williamson ?
+++
Q-- Can you explain why there should be such a problem about photography, or a consideration of a short time, if in fact you'd recovered this fragment four months earlier?
A-- No, I can't. I'm sorry.
Q-- Well, let's go on to the next paragraph for a moment, Dr. Hayes. "I feel that this fragment could be potentially most important, so any light your lads and lasses can shed upon the problem of identifying it would be most welcome." Do you see that, Dr. Hayes?
A-- Yes, I do.
Q-- Now, what light do you think the lads and lasses could shed upon something which they clearly haven't seen if you had recovered it from the collar of a shirt ?
A-- *Well, I think probably it would be better to put that question to Mr. Feraday, as he wrote the memo. I would rather not speculate.
+++
*Negiligent or intent, Feraday was not asked about this question !!!
The fraud with the RARDE EXAMINATION auxiliary side no. 51 doc. no. 8131. (google translation, german/english):
Photo (no. 329) of (RARDE) noted on the additional examinations page 51. Original text from expert Allen Feraday including its question mark:
"A portion of the ? neckband of a grey ? shirt, severely damaged with localized penetrations and explosive blackening", shows a portion of a neckband of a grey shirt.
Traped in the grey material within the blackned area were marked under- part "PT/35":
(a) several fragments of black plastics.
(b) a fragment of a green coloured circuit board.
(c) small fragments of metal wire."
The part marked under PT/35 (b) say it is a fragment of a green colored circuit board --, circled in red on RARDE-photo nr. 329, but it is a photo montage !
It can absolutely ruled out that the depicted green coloured fragment was from a MST-13 timer...
The real MST-13 timer fragment (prod.photo nr.334) was blackned carbonize on both sides. The photographic evidence EXAMINATION (nr.12) of RARDE shows that the green solder mask coating on the front page was totally black burned out (carbonize).
*>> The Scottish Police Chief Inspector William Williamson said, Allen Feraday, the forensic examiner had sent a fax to the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) Stuart Henderson in January 1990 about items he found blasted into a "Slalom" shirt.
The most significant item was a fingernail size circuit board, green in color, with solder for a circuit on one side only. This fragment became known as PT-35.
Hans Knaus (Swiss Police commissar of "BUPO") expressed his concerns and those of Edwin Bollier (MEBO Ltd.) The first was that the CIA had planted the "PT-35" fragment (MST-13) in the wreckage found at Lockerbie.
Henderson and I (Marquise) told him this thought had also crossed our minds. Neither of us believed the CIA or any government official would do such a thing, but we had discussed the possibility. >>
* Confirmed in the book of FBI Special Agent Richard A. Marquise, title: "SCOTBOM: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation".
The grey neckband of a grey shirt was marked under PI/995, Ref. PP'8932:
MEBO's forensic investigation about the fragment PI/995:
A digital enlargement by the scientific service in Zurich, shows that the weave of the textile material (cloth) is not descended from a grey shirt, but by a white T-shirt !
photo nr. 329
Part PI/995, a T-shirt fragment was found first on the 10th October 1989, of Allen Feraday (RARDE) and was listed on, in EXAMINATION page No. 112, This confirmed that all data, like "PT/35 (b)" associated with part (PI/995) exist prior to October 10th, 1989, are fake !
Summary: Item PI/995 is not from a grey shirt "Slalom" brand, but from a white T-shirt, "Abanderado" brand !
Which answer gave Anthony Gauci, as witness number 595, in Kamp van Zeist, when him the T-shirt, make "Abanderado" was shown.
Gauci say:
A-- It's underwear, T-shirt.
Q-- What make is it ?
A-- It's Abanderado make.
Q-- Did you, in 1988, stock T-shirts of that kind ?
A-- Yes. Yes. When I sold this one, I didn't sell T-shirts. Perhaps somebody else was there. I never sold him a T-shirt.
Q-- You never sold the Libyan gentleman a T-shirt ?
A-- On that day, no. On that particular order, no, that we are talking about, no. He could have come another day.
Further convincing details follow...
by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd. Switzerland
MISSION LOCKERBIE, 2012:
Apology: I would like to express my apologies for my country Switzerland. The country where I was born; I was always proud to be a swiss. The swiss invented the "Red Cross", Switzerland was intitiating the Geneva Convention, Switzerland is one of the oldest democracy on this planet (1291 ad.).
I was also trusting in swiss authorities and institutions. This trust has been severely damaged. Once again, I ask for apology for the dubious role from the Intelligence Service in Switzerland (ex BUPO) in the "Lockerbie-Affair", has assumed in the whole tragedy (direct victims as well as "collataral damage" to of the Libyan people now NTC).
Notabene: Ex (BUPO) had nothing to do with the real bombing of PanAm 103, only with the "Lockerbie-Affair" against the ex Libyan regime!
I and MEBO Ltd. have in Switzerland charge against persons of ex "BUPO" submitted and compensation in million of SFR in-complained.
Please see the Affidavit (Official Certification) from 18th July, 2007, from Eng. Ulrich Lumpert.
by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland